My research interests focus on political contestation, democratization and democratic consolidation in the developing world. I use a variety of methods and evidence-gathering techniques to explore these topics, including in-depth interviewing, archival research, statistical analysis, and process tracing.
Dissertation project
Dilemmas of Opposition: Building Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Societies
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties embrace flawed electoral and governing processes. Yet participating in these regimes creates dilemmas for the opposition. Under what conditions do they push for democratizing reforms, and when do they seek power without reform? What explains divergent patterns of party building and opposition among opposition parties in the same political environment ? This dissertation answers these questions by examining the characteristics and strategic interactions that shape opposition party behavior in authoritarian regimes. To expand beyond niche constituencies, parties must work to build connections to new voters and to coordinate with other opposition parties. But forging these connections often fundamentally conflicts with deeply-held electoral, policy, and regime goals of parties. Building on theories of democratization and “dual games” in authoritarian settings, I develop a framework to understand party strategy in balancing regime-oriented behavior with party goals. I argue that party brand, organization, and founding goals shape how parties approach dilemmas of expansion and strategic interactions with other key actors. Electorally strong and rooted parties can present significant electoral challenges to incumbent regimes, but strategies to win broader support often entail moderation away from both party-specific and systemic-oriented goals in pursuit of power.
I test the theory empirically using evidence gathered from 16 months of field research in Malaysia. I examine opposition party dilemmas in three sites of contestation: in expanding opposition parties' electoral bases of support; in advancing policy objectives in constrained national and subnational institutions; and in coordinating with other opposition actors. I use multiple methods - elite interviews, observation of campaigns, protests, and party congresses, archival documents, survey data, and hand-coded election results to demonstrate the theory’s applicability in Malaysia's durable authoritarian regime. I develop case studies from other competitive authoritarian regimes to demonstrate how party characteristics influences outcomes of individual and collective party building. The findings of this study contribute to literatures on political parties, opposition in authoritarian regimes, and democratization.
Selected works in progress (see CV for list of publications)
Growth without Moderation? Building Opposition Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes (Job Market Paper)
Opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes face a key electoral challenge: making persuasive appeals to the broader electorate, often across ethnic, religious, and territorial lines. How do these parties strategize to win over support among new audiences, and what are the tradeoffs that parties face in doing so? In this paper, I focus on two strategies: party broadening, where parties try to change party brand and organization to become more broadly appealing, and coalition building, when opposition parties collectively build an anti-regime identity to harness voter discontent with the regime. When regime support wanes, parties built around demographically limited core audiences are more likely to pursue party broadening to expand their base of support. However, weak regimes also encourage formation of anti-regime coalitions to appeal to a broad audience of discontented regime supporters. Coalition building reduces incentives for party broadening, since coalitions encourage parties to appeal to new voters on the basis of a collective opposition identity while sticking to existing party brands. This helps explain why opposition parties often fail to transform into broad-based parties even in the face of crumbling incumbent support. I use the theory to explain divergent party behavior in authoritarian Malaysia, currently the world’s longest-running dominant party regime. I compare the country’s three main opposition parties, which have vacillated between strategies aimed at shoring up core support and attempts to transform party brands and construct coalitions. The findings provide insight into processes of party building and political contestation in competitive authoritarian regimes.
Governing from the Margins: Subnational Office and Opposition Control in Authoritarian Regimes
(Under review)
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties frequently contest and win subnational offices even while failing to gain national office. Yet governing at the local level introduces dilemmas for opposition parties in using limited fiscal and policymaking power in service of their broader goals. How do opposition parties use local office to advance party goals? When does gaining subnational power strengthen or undermine the national ambitions of opposition parties? To answer these questions, this paper focuses on two sources of variation: the resources and responsibilities that authoritarian regimes allocate to local governments and their strategic response to opposition wins, and the identities and cleavages which opposition parties use to mobilize support. Since regimes must devolve at least some authority to local offices, opposition parties benefit from even limited control over resources to strengthen organizations and ties with voters. Subnational office can be problematic for parties, however, in reconciling local and national political competition. Parties with national ambitions face difficulties in implementing their platform at the local level; alternately, parties may satisfy core voters at the local level but end up limiting their broader appeal by implementing divisive policy in office. To show that opposition party characteristics are important to explaining variation in success across party, I compare three distinct opposition parties in office in Malaysia’s long-running dominant party authoritarian system. All three parties have used state-level governments to build up party organizations and material ties with voters, but provoked conflict within and between parties over core policy objectives. This paper contributes new perspectives and findings on the undertheorized phenomenon of subnational control by opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes.
Dissertation project
Dilemmas of Opposition: Building Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Societies
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties embrace flawed electoral and governing processes. Yet participating in these regimes creates dilemmas for the opposition. Under what conditions do they push for democratizing reforms, and when do they seek power without reform? What explains divergent patterns of party building and opposition among opposition parties in the same political environment ? This dissertation answers these questions by examining the characteristics and strategic interactions that shape opposition party behavior in authoritarian regimes. To expand beyond niche constituencies, parties must work to build connections to new voters and to coordinate with other opposition parties. But forging these connections often fundamentally conflicts with deeply-held electoral, policy, and regime goals of parties. Building on theories of democratization and “dual games” in authoritarian settings, I develop a framework to understand party strategy in balancing regime-oriented behavior with party goals. I argue that party brand, organization, and founding goals shape how parties approach dilemmas of expansion and strategic interactions with other key actors. Electorally strong and rooted parties can present significant electoral challenges to incumbent regimes, but strategies to win broader support often entail moderation away from both party-specific and systemic-oriented goals in pursuit of power.
I test the theory empirically using evidence gathered from 16 months of field research in Malaysia. I examine opposition party dilemmas in three sites of contestation: in expanding opposition parties' electoral bases of support; in advancing policy objectives in constrained national and subnational institutions; and in coordinating with other opposition actors. I use multiple methods - elite interviews, observation of campaigns, protests, and party congresses, archival documents, survey data, and hand-coded election results to demonstrate the theory’s applicability in Malaysia's durable authoritarian regime. I develop case studies from other competitive authoritarian regimes to demonstrate how party characteristics influences outcomes of individual and collective party building. The findings of this study contribute to literatures on political parties, opposition in authoritarian regimes, and democratization.
Selected works in progress (see CV for list of publications)
Growth without Moderation? Building Opposition Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes (Job Market Paper)
Opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes face a key electoral challenge: making persuasive appeals to the broader electorate, often across ethnic, religious, and territorial lines. How do these parties strategize to win over support among new audiences, and what are the tradeoffs that parties face in doing so? In this paper, I focus on two strategies: party broadening, where parties try to change party brand and organization to become more broadly appealing, and coalition building, when opposition parties collectively build an anti-regime identity to harness voter discontent with the regime. When regime support wanes, parties built around demographically limited core audiences are more likely to pursue party broadening to expand their base of support. However, weak regimes also encourage formation of anti-regime coalitions to appeal to a broad audience of discontented regime supporters. Coalition building reduces incentives for party broadening, since coalitions encourage parties to appeal to new voters on the basis of a collective opposition identity while sticking to existing party brands. This helps explain why opposition parties often fail to transform into broad-based parties even in the face of crumbling incumbent support. I use the theory to explain divergent party behavior in authoritarian Malaysia, currently the world’s longest-running dominant party regime. I compare the country’s three main opposition parties, which have vacillated between strategies aimed at shoring up core support and attempts to transform party brands and construct coalitions. The findings provide insight into processes of party building and political contestation in competitive authoritarian regimes.
Governing from the Margins: Subnational Office and Opposition Control in Authoritarian Regimes
(Under review)
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties frequently contest and win subnational offices even while failing to gain national office. Yet governing at the local level introduces dilemmas for opposition parties in using limited fiscal and policymaking power in service of their broader goals. How do opposition parties use local office to advance party goals? When does gaining subnational power strengthen or undermine the national ambitions of opposition parties? To answer these questions, this paper focuses on two sources of variation: the resources and responsibilities that authoritarian regimes allocate to local governments and their strategic response to opposition wins, and the identities and cleavages which opposition parties use to mobilize support. Since regimes must devolve at least some authority to local offices, opposition parties benefit from even limited control over resources to strengthen organizations and ties with voters. Subnational office can be problematic for parties, however, in reconciling local and national political competition. Parties with national ambitions face difficulties in implementing their platform at the local level; alternately, parties may satisfy core voters at the local level but end up limiting their broader appeal by implementing divisive policy in office. To show that opposition party characteristics are important to explaining variation in success across party, I compare three distinct opposition parties in office in Malaysia’s long-running dominant party authoritarian system. All three parties have used state-level governments to build up party organizations and material ties with voters, but provoked conflict within and between parties over core policy objectives. This paper contributes new perspectives and findings on the undertheorized phenomenon of subnational control by opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes.
